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I. LEGAL ISSUES AND SCOPE OF STUDY
The Six Day Arab-Israeli War which commenced on June 5, 1967 was
the third major outbreak of major hostilities between Israel and her
Arab neighbors since the proclamation of Israel's independence in 19^8.
As a result of the Six Day War Israel seized and continues to occupy the
West Bank of the Jordan River, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula and
the Golan Heights of Syria. These territories placed Israel in control
of an area three times larger than that held on June k
.
Israel has
steadfastly maintained that it continues to occupy the Arab territories
seized for the purpose of security and that the occupation is conducted
in accordance with the humanitarian principles laid down in the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
of August 12, 19**9 (hereafter referred to as the Civilians Convention).
Nevertheless, questions have arisen concerning Israel's territorial ob-
jectives within the occupied territories. Additionally, issues have
been raised in respect to Israel's compliance with the Civilians Conven-
tion.
In as much as fundamental human values, particularly the right to
self -detcrmi nati on and the dignity of the human person, are at stake,
the purpose of this study is to juridically evaluate Zionist sovereignty
objectives and Israel's compliance with the Civilians Convention.

II. BASIC GOALS OF ZIONISM
Ever since the founding of modern day political Zionism by Theodor
Herzl, the ultimate aim of Zionism has been the restoration and preser-
2
vation of Jewish sovereignty in an independent Jewish State. It would
be this sovereign State which would achieve for the Jewish people the two
underlying aims of Zionism, which are in the words of Dr. Goldmann, the
president of The World Zionist Organization:
(T)o save Jews suffering
from discrimination and
persecution by giving them
the opportunity for a decent
and meaningful life in their
own homeland; second, to
ensure the survival of the
Jewish people against the
threat of disintegration
and disappearance in those
parts of the world where
they enjoy full equality
of rights. 3
The ultimate goal of Jewish sovereignty in a Jewish State was first
articulated by Herzl in his now famous book The Jewi sh State, which he
wrote in 1 896 in reaction to the anti-Semitism rampant in Europe during
the 19th Century. What he called for was "the restoration of the Jewish
State." What he asked for was:
Let the sovereignty be
granted us over a portion
of the globe large enough
to satisfy the rightful
requirements of a nation;
the rest we shal 1 manage
for outselves.->
It was also Herzl who first defined for Zionism what the configu-
ration of the future State would be. He stated:

The northern frontier is to
be the mountains facing Cap-
podocia; the southern the
Suez Canal. Our slogan shall




It is indeed interesting to note at this point that the present
territories held by Zionist Israel are all well within the territorial
goals of Herzl
.
In 1897 Herzl convened the First Zionist Congress at Basle, Switz-
erland. The Congress proceeded to establish the World Zionist Organi-
zation as it is known today, and the Congress set forth its aims in the
Basle Declaration in the following words: "The aim of Zionism is to
3
create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law."
As a means to attain this goal the Basle Declaration called for the pro-
motion of Jewish colonization of Palestine and the initiation of prepa-
ratory steps leading towards the eventual obtainment of government consent
for the Zionist aim. With the creation of the World Zionist Organization
and the proclamation of Zionist aims in the Basle Declaration there is
the official launching of the Zionist movement as it exists today.
It should be noted that the Basle Declaration employed the ambig-
uous term "home" instead of "State" in expressing its ultimate goal.
It must be made clear that the adoption of the word "home" was a move
made for the purpose of enhancing the Zionist program among both Jews
9
and non-Jews opposed to Zionist nationality and nationhood concepts.
There was never any intention to derogate from Herzl 's original aim of
ul timate creati on of a Jewish State, and this is evident from statements
made by Herzl himself. In commenting on the ambiguous concept created

by the employment of the term "home" Herzl was led to remark: "No need
to worry.... The people will read it as 'Jewish State'." That Zionism
was originally aiming at the creation of a sovereign Jewish State in
Palestine is also evident from the following comment by Herzl:
If I were to sum up the
Basle Congress in one word
--which I shall not do openly
--it would be this; at
Basle I founded the Jewish
State. If I were to say
this today, I would be met
by universal laughter. In
five years, perhaps, and
certainly in fifty, every-
one wi 1 1 see it.''
Accordingly, the ultimate aim of Zionism to create an independent
State, as witnessed by its fruition in the establishment of present day
Israel, remained intact; it was only concealed by the use of terminology
which would later be incorporated in official agreements and subsequently
interpreted as authorization for an independent State.
The establishment of Israel in 19^+8 was certainly a manifestation
of the Zionist dream. The territories seized in the Six Day War of 19^7?
would if ever amalgamated with Israel certainly accord with the Zionist
ai m.
Implicit to the aims of Zionism is a claim of sovereignty based
upon Biblical and historical right. Zionism also justifies its sover-
eignty in Palestine upon the Balfour Declaration, the League of Nations
Mandate, the United Nations partition resolution, and conquest. It is
to the juridical evaluation of these claims to sovereignty wi thi n their
historical context that attention will now be directed.

III. JURIDICAL EVALUATION OF ZIONIST CLAIMS TO SOVEREIGNTY WITHIN THEIR
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
A. CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY BASED UPON BIBLICAL PROMISE
That the Bible forms a basis for asserting Zionist claims to sov-
ereignty in Palestine is evident from the following statement made by
Israel's Chief Rabbi Nissim relative to the territories seized by Israel
during the Six Day War:
Jerusalem and the land of
Israel are holy to us. The
land was promised to us by
the Almighty, and all the
prophets foretold its return
to us. Therefore, it is
forbidden for any Jew even
to consider returning any
part whatsoever of the land
of our forefathers . ^
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The Zionist claim of right to sovereignty in Palestine based upon
Biblical promise must be rejected since the Bible is not considered a
basis in international law for recognition of the legality of States.
If it were not for the fact that so many are misled by Zionist Biblical
claims, discussion of this claim would end at this point. The reality
of the situation is that so many Jews, and even Christians, approve of
the assertion of this claim which is based upon certain promises made
by God to Abraham and his defendants in the book of Genesis 15:18:
Unto thy seed have I given
this land, from the river
of Egypt unto the great
river, the river Euphrates.
There are numerous other passages which could be quoted, but simply
are not because the passage set forth is the most representative and

relevant. It is believed by some that these promises were made to Jews
and Jews alone. However, Biblical scholars have pointed out that such
is not the case. The promises were made to the seed of Abraham which
included the Arabs descended from Abraham's oldest son Ishmael. As
such the Biblical promise gives the Arabs a good, if not better, claim
to sovereignty in Palestine than the Jews, many of whom are descendant
of converts with no possible relation to Abraham. As aforementioned, a
Biblical claim to sovereignty has no basis in international law. The
Biblical refutation is presented only to enlighten those who would seek
to give international sanction to a Zionist State based upon improper
interpretation of the Bible.
B. CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY BASED UPON HISTORICAL RIGHT
Since the conquest of Jerusalem and Palestine by Rome in 63 B.C.
there was no Jewish State in Palestine until the establishment of Israel
in 19^8. The Jews had their first contact with Palestine about 1800 B.C
when Abraham i ed his followers to the outskirts of Palestine. History
reveals that up until the kingdoms of Saul, David and Solomon, Hebrew
tribes conquered and settled among the Canaani tes and were governed by
Judges. Around 1000 B.C. King Saul united the various tribes into one
kingdom. King David, Saul's successor, extended the kingdom's borders
by conquering Amman, Moab, Edom, Damascus and Jerusalem, the latter of

which he made his capital. David was succeeded by his son Solomon who
built the first temple in Jerusalem. At this point it should be added
that it is this former kingdom that provides the religious and emotional
basis for Jewish interest in Palestine and Zionist territorial claims.
The united kingdom was divided into the kingdoms of Israel and
Judah around 900 B.C. and they were overwhelmed from the 8th Century
B.C. onwards by successive waves of Persians, Assyrians and Babylonians.
In 1^3 B.C. Jewish sovereignty was once again restored until the conquest
by Rome in 63 B.C. A Jewish revolt against Roman authority in 135 A.D.
led to the destruction of Jerusalem and its temple and the great dis-
persion of Palestine's Jews to various parts of the world, commonly
known as the diaspora.
It is this historic connection with Palestine upon which the Zion-
ists base their historic right to sovereignty. What can be seen is that
the Arabs have just as much ancient historic connection with Palestine
as the Jews. It is clear that the ancient Hebrews were not the original
inhabitants of Palestine. The original inhabitants were the Canaani tes
who were conquered by the Hebrews. The Canaani tes being of Semi tic -Arab
stock would give the Arabs of Palestine as much historic right to Pales-
tine as the Jews today, many of whom are not of Semitic origin but of
different ethnic backgrounds. Additionally, when the Hebrews originally
came to Palestine they never occupied or ruled over all of the area that
is today Israel. The coastal plain of Palestine remained under the author
1 R
i ty of the Philistines who gave Palestine its name.
From a juridical standpoint the Zionist claim to sovereignty in

Palestine based upon historic right must be rejected. For the recogni-
tion of a valid historic title in international law it is necessary that
the claimant State exercise effective sovereignty over the territory
claimed and that this display of sovereignty be uninterrupted and peace-
la
ful and acquiesced in by other States. The principle of effective
sovereignty, acquiesced in by other States was lucidly described in the
Island of Palmas Arbitration. In this case a dispute arose between the
Netherlands and the United States concerning the sovereignty over the
Island of Palmas. The United States manitained that they were entitled
to be regarded as territorial sovereign on the basis of succeeding to
Spain, who in turn had established its title to the island on the basis
of discovery. The Netherlands opposed the United States claim by arguing
that it was entitled to legal sovereignty by virtue of its continuous
and peaceful display of actual and real possession over the island for
several centuries. In his decision Judge Huber, the sole arbitrator,
found in favor of the Netherlands by holding that title based upon
effective sovereignty, exercised continuously and peacefully for several
centuries is superior to a claim based on discovery alone. In the words
of Judge Huber:
(D)iscovery alone, without
any subsequent act, cannot
at the present time suffice
to prove sovereignty over
the Island of Palmas....
...(A)n inchoate title could
not prevail over the con-
tinuous and peaceful dis-
play of authori ty by another
State 20

In considering the Zionist claim to historic title over Palestine
it becomes clear that Jewish sovereignty was interrupted after the con-
quest by Rome and not reestablished until 19^8. Prior to 19^8 effective
sovereignty was clearly exercised over Palestine by Rome, the Moslem
Arabs, the Crusaders and the Ottoman Empire. From 1923 until 19^8 Great
Britain administered Palestine under a League of Nations mandate. Ever
since the establishment of Zionist Israel in 19^8, the surrounding States
have refused to recognize its sovereignty over any territory in its pos-
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session. This lack of acquiescence would by itself render control non-
peaceful. However, even despite this lack of acquiescence, the situation
of Israeli control over Arab territory is rendered non-peaceful by the
existence of continued hostilities since the time of the establishment
of Israel. Accordingly, the conclusion is inescapable that the Zionist
claim to sovereignty in Palestine based upon historic right finds no
support in international law.
C. CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY BASED UPON THE BALFOUR DECLARATION
After the Basle Congress, the Zionists set out to achieve govern-
mental support for their aim of creating a State for the Jewish people
in Palestine. In 1 898 Herzl sought in vain the support of Germany's
Kaiser Wilhelm II. 2 In 1 901 and 1902 he sought the aid of Abdul Hamid.

23Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, but he was turned down. Herzl then
turned his attention to Britain which did ultimately offer the East
2k
African Protectorate of Uganda. While Herzl was willing to accept
25
this offer as a temporary solution, the Seventh Zionist Congress in
1906, two years after Herzl's death, rejected any territory other than
Palestine with the following resolution:
The Zionist Organization
stands firmly by the fun-
damental principle of the
Basle programme, namely
the creation of a homeland
guaranteed by public law
for the Jewish people in
Palestine, and reject both
as an aim and as a means,
every colonizing action
outside Palestine and the
neighboring countries (em-
phasis supplied) ,^°
This resolution is most significant in two respects: firstly, the
Zionist movement was from that time on unequivocally and resolutely de-
termined on a homeland in Palestine; and secondly, for the fact that it
revealed for the first time a united front aimed at possible territorial
expansion into neighboring countries, a fact which throws glaring light
on the events of June 1967.
The Zionist movement, under Dr. Chaim Weizmann, continued its ef-
forts to obtain British approval and support for its aims. As early as
1906 Weizmann had interested the British government through Lord Arthur
27
Balfour in the possibility of a Jewish home in Palestine. After the
outbreak of World War I, the British government entered into negotiations
with the Zionists concerning a Jewish home in Palestine and what emerged
10

was the issuance of the Balfour Declaration on November 2, 1917 which
stated:
His Majesty's Government
view with favour the estab-
lishment in Palestine of a
national home for the Jewish
people, and wi 11 use their
best endeavours to facili-
tate the achievement of this
object, it being clearly
understood that nothing
shall be done which may
prejudice the civi 1 and
religious rights of exist-
ing non-Jewish communities
in Palestine, or the rights
and political status enjoyed „o
by Jews in any other country.
While altruistic motives did to some extent stand behind the Balfour
Declaration, it has become clear that the issuance of the document was
directly motivated by the need of the British government to obtain sup-
port of world Jewry at a time when the allied position during World War
I was doing badly. In words of British Prime Minister Lloyd George:
It was important for us to
seek every legitimate help
we could get. We came to
the conclusion from infor-
mation we received from
every part of the world
that i t was vital we should
have the sympathi es of the
Jewish community. ^9
Despite the two apparently unequivocal safeguard clauses contained
in the Balfour Declaration protecting the civil and religious rights of
the existing indigenous non-Jewish communities in Palestine and the po-
litical rights of Jews in any other nation, the Zionists interpret the




and juridical acceptance of the Jewish people nationality claim.
It must be pointed out that at the time of the issuance of the
Balfour Declaration in 1917? Palestine and the surrounding territories
were under recongized Ottoman sovereignty, and thus Great Brtiain could
not enter into an agreement, binding in international law, promising a
national home in an area over which Britain did not have sovereignty.
Furthermore, the promise could be considered invalid in international
law because it derogated from the internationally accepted legal prin-
3 1
ciple recognizing the right of self-determination of people.
Nevertheless, the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine incor-
porated within its provisions the essential terms of the Balfour Decla-
ration promising the establishment of a national home for the Jewish
people in Palestine along with the same safeguards protecting the civil
and religious rights of the indigenous non-Jewish communities in Pales-
tine and the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other
32
country. The incorporation of the terms of the Balfour Declaration
is significant because it involved explicit agreement by the League to
the terms of the Balfour Declaration and as such amounted to multilateral
approval of its terms and rendered the Balfour Declaration a valid part
33
of international law.
The Balfour Declaration having been recognized by the League of
Nations as a valid part of international law, it becomes necessary to
provide an analysis as to what was expressly agreed to between Great
Britain, and subsequently by the League of Nations. The Zionist approach




and unambiguous. As previously mentioned they interpret the politica
promise clause, that is, the promise to establish a national home for
the Jewish people, as juridical acceptance for the establishment of a
Jewish State in Palestine. Additionally, they interpret the Balfour
Declaration as acceptance of their Jewish People nationality claim, a
claim which will not undergo comprehensive analysis within this study
but which will nevertheless be discussed in so far as it is relevant in
providing an understanding as to what was agreed to between the parties
in respect to the political promise.
In respect to the safeguard clauses, the Zionists interpret them
as mere agreement of assurance that the non-Jewish population wi 11 be
35
accorded protected minority status in a Jewish State, and that Jews
who are members of a collective nationality will as individuals be pro-
tected in their States of regular nationality.
The Zionist clear and unambiguous interpretative approach to the
Balfour Declaration cannot be accepted because a rational and logical
approach to interpretation requires at the minimum the giving of mean-
ing to an agreement which accords with "the objectives of the partici-
pants and principal purposes sought to be effectuated." In this re-
spect the following enlightened approach is set forth:
The process of interpretation,
rightly conceived, cannot be
regarded as a mere mechanical
one of drawing inevitable mean-
ing from the words in a text,
or of searching for and dis-
covering some preexisting
specific intention of the
parties with respect to
every, situation arising un-
der a treaty. It is precisely
13

because words used in an
instrument rarely have ex-
act and single meaning,
and because all possible
situations which may arise
under it cannot be or at
least are not, forseen and
expressly provided for by
the parties at the time of
its drafting, that the ne-
cessity for interpretation
occurs. In most instances,
therefore, interpretation
involves giving a meaning
to a text--not just any
meaning which appears to
the interpreter, to be sure,
but a meaning which in the
light of the text under con-
sideration and of the par-
ticular case at hand appears
in his considered judgment
to be one which is logical,
reasonable, and most likely
to accord with and to effec-
tuate the larger general
purpose which the parties ~
desired the treaty to serve.
In addition the following rules of interpretation should be re-
sorted to because of their suitability: 1) agreements should be inter-
preted in a manner so as not to conflict with generally recognized prin-
39
ciples of international law; 2) the whole of the agreement must be
L\0
taken into consideration if any one of the terms are an&iguous; 3) a
good starting point in ascertaining the objectives of participants and
the principle purposes to be effectuated is the record of negotiations
( travaux pr epara toi res ) , a well established method of interpretation
utilized by international tribunals.
Turning to the negotiating history of the Balfour Declaration, it
is clear that at the commencement of negotiations, the British government's
1';

position was to work in favor of a promise establishing a refuge or
Lj 2
asylum in Palestine for Jewish victims of persecution. The Zionist
position on the other hand was presented in the form of a draft proposal
submitted by Lord Rothschild to Lord Balfour, Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, stating:
1. His Majesty's Govern-
ment accepts the principle
that Palestine should be
constituted as the National
Home of the Jewish people.
2. His Majesty's Govern-
ment will use its best en-
deavours to secure the a-
chi evement of this object
and wi 11 discuss the neces-
sary methods and means with
the Zionist Organization. 3
It is implicit in the proposed Zionist draft that they were seeking
1) recognition of a Jewish State in Palestine, 2) recognition of the Jew-
ish people nationality concept and 3) recognition of a juridical connec-
ts
tion between "the National Home" and "the Jewish people." Additionally,
it is quite apparent that the proposed draft contained neither safeguards
for the indigenous non-Jewish Arab communities in Palestine nor for anti-
Zionist Jews opposed to Zionist nationhood and nationality concepts.
Aware of the nationalistic aspirations among the native Palestinian
Arabs, and the need for their support in the war effort, British officials
quite naturally opposed the comprehensive demands of the Zionists as
contained in the Zionist draft. Additionally, prominent British Jews
opposed the aims of the Zionists, especially Edwin Montagu, British
Secretary of State for India, and Mr. Claude Montefiore, both of whom
were participating in the negotiations. Montagu was appalled at the pros-
pect of the British government accepting the Zionist proposals because
15

he considered that the creation of a national home for Jews would make
it difficult for him to exercise political authority on behalf of Bri t-
ai n.
As a result of the objections, there emerged from the negotiations
a government counter-proposal known as the Milner-Amery draft which di-
luted the demands of the Zionists into a proposal by which the British
government would use its best endeavors to establish in Palestine "a
national home for the Jewish race" with clear safeguards providing:
(T)hat nothing will be done
which may prejudice the civil
and religious rights of ex-
isting non- Jewish communities
in Palestine or the rights
and political status enjoyed
in any other country by such
Jews who are fully contented
with their existing nationali-
ty and ci ti zenshi p. 7
It is thus evident that there was a definite interest by the British
government to protect the claims and interests of the Palestinian Arabs
and non-Zionist Jews. In fact Weizmann, who was also participating in
the negotiations, considered this counter proposal a painful recession
and a great departure from the original Zionist aim.
Although the Milner-Amery draft contained definite safeguards, the
counter-proposal nevertheless did not meet with the approval of anti
-
Zionist Jews, especially Mont efi ore who objected to the implicit impli-
cation of a Jewish nationality in the phrase "a national home for the
1, g
Jewish race." These same objections were voiced by Justice Brandeis
of the United States when Weizmann wired to him the text of the counter-
proposal. As a result Brandeis proposed that "Jewish race" be altered
16

to "Jewish people." Additionally, Brandeis and other leading American
Zionists requested substitution of the words "the rights and civil polit-
ical status enjoyed by Jews in any other country" for "the rights and
political status enjoyed in any other country by such Jews who arc fully
contented with their existing nationality and citizenship." Brandeis 1
participation in revising the counter-proposa 1 was necessitated because
of his status in being one of President Wilson's closest confidants.
What the Zionists needed was the President's approval, knowing full well
that the British government would be reluctant to act favorably without
American approval. On October 17, 1917 President Wilson sent his ap-
53proval of the text as revised by Brandeis.
Thus, there was a further recession from original Zionist demands.
,
What finally emerged from all these recessions after taking into account
the claims and interests of indigenous Arabs and non-Zionist Jews, was
the officially issued declaration of November 17, 1917, as previously
set forth.
In applying the appropriate rules of interpretation to the Balfour
agreement we find from the negotiating hibcory that the maximum demands
of the Zionists were reduced to an equivocal political promise limited
by express safeguards, safeguards that were inserted to meet the objec-
tions of those individuals who were desirous to protect the aspirations
of the indigenous population of Palestine and desirous to protect non-
Zionist Jews from becoming unwillingly members of a Jewish State with
Jewish nationality. To interpret the safeguards in the manner desired
by the Zionists would not meet the objections of the non-Zionists, for
whom they were inserted. Accordingly, the safeguards must in accordance
17

with reason and logic be interpreted as limiting the political promise
to something less than a national Jewish State. To put it another way,
they must be interpreted in a broad manner because they were inserted
in opposition of the comprehensive designs of the Zionists.
Furthermore, to interpret the Balfour Declaration in a manner con-
sistent with the ultimate but rejected objectives of the Zionists would
render the Balfour Declaration inconsistent with international law. To
interpret the Balfour Declaration as authorization for the creation of
a Jewish State in Palestine would conflict with the right of the Arab
indigenous population to self-determination, a principle firmly implanted
in international law.
How then must the Balfour Declaration be interpreted? It has be-
come clear that the British objective was to help provide a sanctuary in
Palestine for oppressed Jews. This objective was not opposed by the
Zionists in as much as this was part of their overall objective. Wha t
the Zionists sought to superimpose upon the British humanitarian objec-
tive was recognition of a Jewish State in Palestine and Jewish people
nationality. This, as has been discussed, was rejected. Accordingly,
the Balfour Declaration must be interpreted as a humanitarian act to
provide a sanctuary in the form of a cultural home in Palestine where
those Jews who desire can immigrate and settle among the indigenous
population without infringing upon the recognized rights of the indige-
nous non-Jewish Arab population or the rights of non-Zionist Jews in any
other country.

D. CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY BASED UPON THE BRITISH MANDATE
The British Mandate came into effect on September 23, 1923, and as
before mentioned the terms of the Balfour Declaration became incorporated
into the terms of the Mandate. Accordingly, the Balfour Declaration be-
came an international agreement and a valid part of international law.
The Zionists interpret the Mandate provisions incorporating the political
promise clause and the safeguard clauses of the Balfour Declaration in
the same manner as they interpret the Balfour Declaration standing by
itself. Additionally, they argue that the promises contained in the
Mandate were to encompass the territory on both sides of the River Jordan.
The interpretation of the Zionists can be rejected for the same reasons
as have been expressed in the analysis of the Balfour Declaration in the
preceding section. There are, however, even additional factors which
clearly require rejection of the Zionist "clear and unambiguous" in-
terpretation of the Mandate provisions. The preamble of the British
Mandate stated that the purpose of the Mandate was to give effect to
Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Implicit in the
reading of Article 22 is the principle of self-determination, and that
the Mandatory Power was to assist the peoples of the Mandate to achieve
full self-government and independence at the earliest possible date.
Additionally Article 22 recognized the provisional independence of certain
territories formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire. Article 22, para-
graph k stipulated:
Certain communities, formerly
belonging to the Turkish
Empire, have reached a stage
of development where their

existence as independent
nations can be provisionally
recognized, subject to the
rendering of administrative
advice and assistance by a
mandatory power unti 1 such
time as they are able to
stand a lone.
In as much as Palestine is a territory formerly belonging to the
Turkish Empire, its independence was provisionally recognized by the
Covenant. That the League recognized this to be a Palestine nation and
not a Jewish State is clear from the terms of Article 7 of the Mandate
which provided:
The administration of Pales-
tine shall be responsible
for enacting a nationality
law. There shall be includ-
ed in this law provisions
framed so as to facilitate
the acquisition of Pales-
tinian citizenship by Jews
who take up their permanent
r es i d enc e in P a 1 es t i n e
.
Therefore, when considering the terms of the Mandate along with the
supreme consti tutiona 1 instrument of the League, namely the Covenant, it
is clear that the League did not authorize the creation of a Jewish State
with Jewish nationality. What the League recognized was the right of
Jews to immigrate to Palestine wherein they could if they so desire take
up the nationality of the Arab Palestinian nation. Accordingly, the
Zionist interpretation to the "contrary must be rejected.
20

E. CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY BASED UPON THE UNITED NATIONS PARTITION
RESOLUTION
The partition of Palestine was the direct result of two and one
half decades of animosity created by the immigration of Jews into Pales-
tine under the provisions of Article 6 of the Mandate which provided:
The Administration of Pales-
tine, while ensuring that
the rights and position of
other sections of the popu-
lation are not prejudiced,
shall facilitate Jewish im-
migration under suitable
condi ti ons .
At the beginning of the Mandate Moslem and Christian Arabs numbered
92 percent of Palestine's population while Jews comprised 8 percent.'
From the outset of the Mandate the Arab population became concerned over
the immigration of Jews to Palestine which resulted in the Arabs being
disposessed of their historic lands to make way for the incoming Jews.
The Zionist Jewish Agency was in control of land acquisition and was
58
able to purchase Arab lands at knock down prices.
The Arabs became incensed over the increased immigration and the
loss of their lands and began to insist ever more strongly that any
future independent government of Palestine must be responsible to a
government whose Parliament would be elected by the total population
59
comprised of Moslems, Christians and Jews.
With the rise of Hitler to power in Germany in 1933* Jews fled in
increasing numbers to Palestine. This increase in Jewish immigration
only served to further heighten Arab fears. Their concept of a future
independent State became jeopardized as the proportion of Jews climbed
to 30 percent of the population. Frenetic appeals were made by the
21

Arabs to Britain to halt Jewish immigration, to restrict the sale of
Arab land to Jews, and to grant Palestine immediate independence.
The British attempted to mollify the Arabs by offering a legislative
assembly to be elected by proportional representation which would give
the Arabs a majority vote. The Zionists, however, protested to this
formula which would destroy their goal of creating a Jewish State con-
trolled by Jews. As a result the British backed down from their offer.
The Arabs being driven to desparation launched large scale violence
in 1936 which led to Jewish counter-violence. All of Palestine became
an armed camp. In an effort to stem the revolt and bring peace to
the area, the 193& Peel Commission, appointed by the British Parliament,
recommended the partition of Palestine. Both the Twentieth Zionist Con-
gress meeting in 1937 and the Arabs rejected the partition proposal.
As a result violence rose to an even higher pitch.
Finally, wi th violence continuing, Britain called a conference in
London at which it was hoped a solution could be reached which would
satisfy both Arabs and Zionists. A solution could not be reached, and
as a result, the British issued the MacDonald White Paper of 1939.
Therein Britain set forth the policy that Palestine would move progres-
sively towards self-government. Furthermore, Jewish immigration for the
first five years was to be limited to 75,000 with immigration thereafter
to be at the complete acquiescence of the Arabs of Palestine. While
this amounted to a victory for the Arab position, it was clearly considered
/ o
by the Zionists as a defeat and a betrayal by Britain of its promises.
During World War II the political climate in Palestine became con-
69
siderably calmer as attention was focused on an allied victory.
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Nevertheless, the Jewish Agency was able to undertake illegal immigra-
tion of Jews into Palestine during the war period. Additionally, in
19^2 the Zionists were able to call a Zionist conference at the New
York Biltmore Hotel where they rearticulated their aim for a Jewish State
in unequivocal language. The Confernece produced a declaration which
stated in part:
The Congress urges that the
gates of Palestine be opened;
that the Jewish Agency be
vested with control of im-
migration into Palestine
and with the necessary author-
ity for upbuilding the
country, including the de-
velopment of its occupied
and uncultivated lands;
and that Palestine be es-
tablished as a Jewish Com-
monwealth integrated in the
structure of the new demo-
cratic world./'
After the war world Jewry was horror struck at the inhuman slaughter
of 6,000,000 Jews by the Nazi regime, and the Zionists began the final
drive to obtain a Jewish State in Palestine as a refuge for oppressed
Jews. Illegal immigration was increased and in 19'-*6 Jewish terrorist
campaigns were launched against the British administration in Palestine,
most notably by the Haganah, the Irgun and Stern organizations.' Once
again civil war was under way. Once again the British offered partition
as a solution, and once again the Zionists and Arabs rejected the proposal
In despair and weakened by its war sacrifice Britain concluded that it
could no longer administer the Mandate and requested the United Nations




General Assembly. On November 29, 19^7, in opposition of Arab desires,
the General Assembly voted 33 to 13 with 10 abstentions to partition
Palestine into Jewish and Arab States with economic union and United
Nations trusteeship for Jerusalem and the Holy Places.
The whole Arab world protested to the partition proposal, and once
again civil war broke out in Palestine. Atrocities mounted on both
sides, the most notable being the Irgun massacre of 250 Arab men, women
and children at Dei n Yassin in April 19^8.
On May lA, 19^8, one day before the end of the British Mandate, the
Zionists proclaimed the independent State of Israel. The proclamation
of independence proclaimed within its text the independence of Israel
by virtue of the alleged historical right of the Jewish people, the
alleged right of independence recognized in the Balfour Declaration and
the Mandate, and by virtue of the General Assembly partition resolution.
The pertinent section of the November 29, 19^7 General Assembly
partition resolution upon which the Zionists base further justification
for sovereignty is the one in which the General Assembly:
Recommends to the United
Kingdom, as the Mandatory
Power for Palestine, and
to all other Members of the
United Nations the adoption
and implementation, with
regard to the future govern-
ment of Palestine of the
Plan of Partition with Eco-
nomic Uni on . . . .
At this point it should be mentioned that the partition resolution
was a violation of the United Nations Charter in that it failed to accord
to the indigenous people of Palestine their right to self-determination.
2k

This right is specifically recognized by Article I of the Charter which
lists as an aim of the world organization the "respect for the principle
of equal rights and self-determination." The. right of self-determination
is additionally set forth in respect to non-self governing territories
in Article 73 of the Charter by the requirement that "the interests of
the inhabitants of these territories are paramount" and by the requirement
"to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples."
Furthermore, it violated the provisions of Chapter II (Article 75-85) on
the International Trusteeship System, in which the United Nations set
forth the conditions under which it could take action in regard to cer-
tain territories including Mandates. Under Article 75 , the United Na-
tions could administer and supervise "such territories as may be placed
thereunder by subsequent individual agreements." Article 80 provides
in part:
Except as may be agreed upon
in individual trusteeship
agreements .. .pi aci ng each
territory under the trustee-
ship system, and until such
agreements have been conclud-
ed, nothing in this Chapter
shall be construed in or of
itself to alter in any manner
the rights whatsoever of any
States or any people or the
terms of existing international
instruments to which Members of
the United Nations may respec-
ti vely be parti es
.
Thus, there could be no alteration of the rights granted to the
indigenous Arabs of Palestine by the Mandate until a trusteeship agree-
ment would be drawn up. No such agreement was ever entered into in the
case of Palestine. Accordingly, the partition resolution, which
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unquestionably altered the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people,
79
was in violation of Article 80 of the Charter.
Turning to the nature and juridical effect of the partition reso-
lution itself, it is submitted that it consists of nothing more than an
uni mpl emented recommendation of the General Assembly. It is generally
considered that the General Assembly has no power to adopt decisions or
resolutions binding in effect except in matters in regard to which a
specific jurisdiction has been conferred upon it, such as election of
the members of various United Nations organs, or participation in the
8f)
admission, suspension, or expulsion of members. The right to decide
with binding effect wi th respect to settling of political disputes by
partition is not an enumerated power given to the General Assembly en-
abling it to decide with compulsory effect. This lack of competency
was apparently recognized by the General Assembly itself in phrasing its
resolution in the form of a recommendation. If the General Assembly as-
sumed it had such power and wished to decide with binding effect, it would
appear logical that the General Assembly would have employed within its
resolution language more decisive and unequivocal than the word "Recom-
mends ."
Thus, aware of its lack of power the General Assembly cleverly sought
to implement and legalize an otherwise invalid resolution by calling upon
the Security Council in the same partition resolution to determine "as
a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, in ac-
cordance with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force
the settlement envisaged by this resolution."
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In February 19^3, the Security Council began consideration of the
General Assembly's partition resolution. Immediately, the question of
the competency of the Security Council to sett 1 e po 1 i t ica 1 disputes by
enforcing partition came under discussion. In this respect the comments
of the United States Representative to the Security Council are pertinent;
The recommendations of the
General Assembly have great
moral force which applies
to all Members regardless
of the views they hold or
the votes they may have
cast on any particular rec-
ommendati on. . . .
The Security Council is
authorized to take forceful
measures with respect to
Palestine to remove a threat
to international peace. The
Charter of the United Nations
does not empower the Security
Council to enforce a political
settlement whether it is pur-
suant to a recommendation of
the General Assembly or of
. the Security Council itself.
What this means is this:
The Security Council under
the Charter can take action
to prevent aggression against
Palestine from outside. The
Security Council, by these
same powers, can take action
to prevent a threat to inter-
national peace and security
from inside Palestine. But
this action must be directed
solely to the maintenance
of international peace. The
Security Council's action,
in other words, is directed




The end result was that the Security Council refused to implement
the partition resolution. A summarized description of what lay behind
the ultimate refusal by the Security Council to implement the partition
resolution has been lucidly described as follows:
(M)ost of the counci 1 members
made it clear that they did
not regard the General Assembly
resolution l3l(ll), including
the partition provision, as
binding upon the Council, and
that the Council would determine
as a threat to the peace, breach
of the peace or an act of aggres-
sion in any event if the Pales-
tine situation so warranted, with-
out reference to the request to
that effect contained in the
resolution. Specifically, in
regard to the questions of com-
petence to enforce the partition
plan, the Council as a whole
considered itself legally incom-
petent. More important, it was
generally of the view that the
partition plan had no practicabil-
ity, for any attempt at the en-
forcement of the plan would further
aggravate the Palestine situation
which the General Assembly and
the Seer etary -Genera 1 hoped to
avoid .82
Accordingly, the conclusion is inescapable that the Zionist claim
to sovereignty in Palestine based upon the partition resolution contra-
vened fundamental provisions of the United Nations Charter relative to
self-determination; secondly, because the General Assembly lacked author
i ty to effect partition; and thirdly, because the Security Council re-
fused to implement the partition resolution, realizing that its powers
can be directed only towards the maintenance of international peace and
not to the settlement of a political question through partition.
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F. CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY BASED UPON CONQUEST
The proclamation of Israel's independence led to the invasion of
Palestine by the armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq.
These hostilities came to an end by Israel signing an armistice with each
of the Arab States involved except Iraq. The armistice agreements were
intended as interim measures until such time as a permanent peace settle-
ment could be negotiated. They were to provide the parties security
from attack, and they were not to be interpreted as political settlements
fixing permanent territorial boundaries. Nevertheless, Israel was left
in control of territory approximately one third larger than that granted
85
8k
it under the General Assembly partition resolution. An added result
was that 750,000 Arabs fled as refugees to the neighboring Arab States.
On May 12, 1 9^+9 , an initiative for peace was undertaken by the
signing of the Lausanne Protocol in which Israel and the Arab States
accepted a proposal which provided a framework for the discussion of
territorial questions, namely that any territorial settlement should
accord substantially with the boundaries set forth in the General Assembly
partition resolution. A few days later Israel proposed that the in-
ternational frontiers of Mandatory Palestine be considered the frontiers
of Israel. The Arabs protested that the Israeli proposals constituted
a repudiation by Israel of the terms of the Protocol, to which the Israeli
delegation replied that "it could not accept a certain proportional dis-
tribution of territory agreed upon in 19^7 as criterion for a territorial
settlement in present circumstances." In essence Israel was continuing
its claim to sovereignty based upon the Palestine Mandate.
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There being no settlement of the territorial question in accordance
with the Lausanne Protocol, Israel's continued occupation of new terri-
tories caused the Arabs to harden against her. The Arabs initiated boy-
cotts against Israel, and Egypt closed the Suez Canal to Israeli ship-
ping. In 1955 total blockade was effectuated against Israeli shipping
00
through the Gulf of.Aqaba. In retaliation Israel struck back in 195&
by joining forces with France and Britain, who were still chafing over
Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal, in attacking and seizing the
89
Sinai Peninsula. However, after strong denunciation from the United
Nations and proding from the United States, Israel was forced to with-
draw behind the 19^9 armistice lines.
In an effort to help secure the peace and to safeguard Israeli ship-
ping through the Gulf of Aqaba, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF)
91took up border supervision between Israel and the United Arab Republic.
The years following the creation of the UNEF were years of continuing
border tension accompanied by an arms build up on both the Arab and
Israeli side. The years also witnessed the creation of the Palestine
Liberation Organization and the Palestine Liberation Army, both of which
92promoted border disturbances and raids against Israel. Tension rose
to new heights when Israel responded to the commando raids by making
strong and devastating retaliatory raids against Arab villages and
93
military installations.
The climax was reached in mid May I967 when information was received
by the Arab States that Israel was massing troops along the Syrian border
in preparation for attack upon that State. In response to this informa-
tion the United Arab Republic and Syria went into military coordination.
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On May 16, 19&7 > tne United Arab Republic declared a state of emergency
and requested the United Nations to remove the UNEF from Egyptian soil.
On May 1 7 > Iraq and Jordan placed their forces on alert. This was fol-
lowed the next day by an order from United Nations Secretary-General
U-Thant to the UNEF to withdraw. When the UNEF forces withdrew from
Sharm-el -Shei kh which overlooks the Straits of "liran, President Nasser
took measures to once again close the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli ships
9^
and all ships carrying strategic cargo to Israel.
Israel responded by launching the Six Day War against its neigh-
boring Arab States. As is well known, Israel seized and continues to
occupy the West Bank of the Jordan River, the Gaza strip, the Sinai
95Peninsula and the Golan Heights of Syria. A tragic consequence of these
hostilities was the displacement of 800,000 Arabs which created a worse
refugee problem. Approximately, 300,000 old refugees from 19^8, 200,000
96Syrians and 300,000 Egyptians fled the newly occupied territories.
On November 22, 1967, the Security Council called for the "With-
drawal of Israeli armed forces from the territories occupied in the
97
recent conflict." The significance of this call for the withdrawal
of Israeli forces, is the fact that the resolution implicitly called
only for withdrawal beyond the 19^9 armistice lines. Thus the Security
Council, latently condoned by ommission the territorial gains made by
Israel in 19^8 while rejecting the 1967 acquisitions of territory. It-
is clear that Israel has no intention of ever returning the territory
seized in 19^8-^9. Israel's position is that the armistice agreements
98
established new boundaries. Additionally, it has become clear that
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Israel has sovereignty designs on the territories occupied in 1967. In
respect to the newly occupied territories, Israel has resettled portions
99
of its own population in these territories. Additionally, Israel has
annexed East Jerusalem and high Israeli officials have stated that Israel
will not withdraw from Jerusalem and that it will not withdraw from
occupied areas such as the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip and portions
of Sinai. Recently, some Zionist officials have demanded the annexa-
tion of a 1 1 the occupied territories and their resettlement by Jews for
the sake of strategic interests and in the name of historic rights.
In view of the invalidity of all the previously discussed claims
to sovereignty in the Middle East, the only other basis upon which the
Zionist State of Israel can base a sovereignty claim within areas oc-
cupied by it is by conquest.
Prior to the 20th Century title to territory by conquest was a
1 02
recognized principle of international law. However, since that time
the inadmissibility of territorial acquisition by force of arms has be-
come a well established principle of international law, and this prin-
103
ciple is applicable to the aggressor and non-aggressor alike. This
principle was assumed by the League of Nations as a necessary implica-
tion of the Covenant's guarantee of the territorial integrity of all
1 0^4
members; it was implicit in the 1928 Kel logg -Briand Pact for the
Renunciation of War; it was specifically recognized by the American
States in the Buenos Aires Declaration of 1936, the Lima Declaration
of 1938 and the Charter of the Organization of American States signed
1 r\0
on April 30, 19^8. Finally, the principle of no acquisition of ter-
ritory by force is a necessary implication of Article 2, paragraph L\ of
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the United Nations Charter which states:
AH Members shall refrain
in their international re-
lations from the threat or





In view of the principle of the inadmissibility of territorial ac-
quisition by war, it is clear that Zionist Israel cannot assert any claim
of sovereignty over the territory acquired by the use of force and its at-
tempt to do so by any past or future annexation must of necessity be
rendered null and void.
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IV. JURIDICAL EVALUATION OF ZIONIST-ISRAEL'S COMPLIANCE WITH THFCIVILIANS CONVENTION
^nrLlM LL E
A. THE NATURE, PURPOSE AND APPLICABILITY OF THE CIVILIANS CONVENTION
In view of the atrocities and brutal treatment accorded combatants
and civilians during World War II, it became necessary after that war to
convene a conference at Geneva for the purpose of codifying into inter-
national law humanitarian rules which would prevent a recurrance of such
actions. As a result four conventions were drafted and became known as
the Geneva Conventions of 1<* 9 . The first three Geneva Conventions deal
with 1) the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in
armed forces in the field; 110 2) the amelioration of the condition of the
wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea; 111 and 3)
the treatment of prisoners of war. 112 The fourth Convention, known as
the Civilians Convention, is designed for the protection of civilian per-
sons in time of war . *
Collectively, the Geneva Conventions constitute one branch of the
law of war known as the
-law of Geneva- and should be distinguished from
the other branch of the law of war known as the
-Law of the Hague- which
was established by the Conventions of 1899 and l 9 7 .
m
The difference
between the two branches is that the
-Law of Hague- lays down the rights
and duties of belligerents in conducting military operations and limits
the methods of warfare, while the
-Law of Geneva- is designed
-to ensure
respect, protection and humane treatment of war casualties and noncom-
batants.- Their similarity lies in the fact that both these branches
of the law of war contain humanitarian principles. 116 The
-Law of the
Hague,- however, is politically motivated and based to great extent on
3'<

military necessity, while the Geneva Conventions originated outside any
political considerations so-ley for the purpose of making individual and
humanitarian principles paramount by securing maximum respect of the
individual by forbidding unnecessary suffering. Furthermore, in
deference to fundamental human rights, the principle of "military neces-
sity" is severely restricted in the Geneva Conventions by Article 1 of
each Convention. This common article states: "The High Contracting
Parties undertake to respect and ensure respect of the present Convention
in all circumstances ." (emphasis supplied). Accordingly, the Conventions
control the operation of "military necessity" and are in no way subject
i i o
to it. It is true that a number of the provisions contained in the
Conventions permit derogation of certain fundamental rights in the case
of imperative "military necessity." However, where derogation is not
permitted by specific authorization within a provision, the effect of
Article 1 is to positively exclude any consideration of "military neces-
1 19
si ty" in carrying out the obligations in question.
Thus, the Geneva Conventions establish within the framework of posi-
tive international law a universally accepted guarantee of the fundamental
rights of individuals in time of conflict, that is to say when such rights
are most threatened. As Dr. Jean S. Pictet, Director of the International
Committee of the Red Cross emphasized:
The Geneva Conventions start
from the hypothesis that law
is a primordial element of
ci vi 1 i zati on. . . .Thei r aim is
to safeguard respect for the
human person, the fundamental
rights of man and his dignity
as a human being, in the hope
that universal peace may one
day be established.' 20
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With respect to the Civilians Convention, it can be said that its
need was necessitated by the total lack of human respect accorded civil-
ians during the Second World War, especially those poor and unfortunate
beings who found themselves at the cruel "mercy" of the Axis Powers in
areas under their occupational control. It is common knowledge that dur-
ing World War II civilians faced at the hands of the Nazis unconscionable
destruction of property, reprisals, collective penalties, deportation and
internment in concentration camps. Civilians by the millions were put to
death in gas chambers.
The purpose, therefore, of the Civilians Convention is to ensure the
dignity of the human person and prevent a recurrence of the horrors per-
petrated against civilians in past wars, especially those committed dur-
ing the last world war. In short, the Civilians Convention operates out
of respect for the human person and safeguards civilians from abusive force
arising out of a situation for which they are not the blame.
The applicability of the Civilians Convention is governed by Article
2 which provides, i nter alia :
(T)he present Convention
shall apply to all cases
of declared war or of any
other armed conflict which
may arise between two or
more of the High Contract-
ing Parties, even if the
state of .war is not recog-
nized by one of them.
Accordingly, States are bound by this provision regardless of how
1 21
the conflict or hostilities are labeled. Additionally, States are
bound to ensure effective application of the Civilians Convention regard-
less of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the conflict. The absolute
%

necessity of such a requirement is aptly stated by Professor Lauterpacht
as fol lows
:
(l)n view of the humanitar-
ian character of a substan-
tial part of the rules of
war it is imperative that
during the war these rules
should be mutually observed
regardless of the legality
of the war. ^ 22
The commencement and termination of the applicability of the Civi I-
i ans Convention is governed by Article 6 which provides that the entire
Convention remains in force as long as there is no "general close of mili
tary operations." As to what is meant by the words "general close of
military operations," the Commentary to the Civilians Convention states
that a general close of military operations exists when there is an end
123
to a 1 1 fighti ng .
The Civilians whom the Civilians Convention is designed to protect
are frequently termed "protected persons." Article h defines such per-
sons as:
(T)hose who, at a given mo-
ment and in any manner what-
soever, find themselves, in
case of a conflict or occu-
pation, in the hands of a
Party to the conflict or Oc-
cupying Power of which they
are not nati ona Is .
Turning to the situation in the Middle East, the conclusion is in-
escapable that the Civilians Convention is applicable to the Israeli
held occupied territories and that Israel is therefore bound to give its
provisions full force and effect. Firstly, Israel and all the surround-
12*4
i ng enemy Arab States are parties to the Convention. Secondly, Israel
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and its neighboring Arab States continue in a state of belligerency.
Hostilities are daily reported. More specifically, Israel and the Arab
States continuously penetrate each other's territories with elements of
their armed forces. Furthermore, the Suez Canal cease fire line is con-
stantly the object of hostilities. Accordingly, all such hostilities
when considered together conclusively establish that military operations
have not come to a close.
B. PROVISIONS PROHIBITING KILLING, TORTURE AND MALTREATMENT
Article 27 provides in part:
Protected persons are enti-
tled, in all circumstances,
to respect for their persons,
their honor, their family
rights, their religious
convictions and practices,
and their manners and cus-
toms
. They shal 1 at all
times be humanely treated,
and shall be protected es-
pecially against all attacks
of violence or threats there-
of and against insults and pub-
lic curi osi ty
.
Women shall be especially
protected against any attack
on their honour, particular-
ly against rape, enforced





No physical or moral coer-
cion shall be exercised
against protected persons,
in particular to obtain
information from thcrn or
from third parties.
Article 32 provides:
The High Contracting Parties
specifically agree that each
of them is prohibited from
taking any measure of such
a character as to cause the
physical suffering or ex-
termination of protected
persons in their hands.
This prohibition applies
not only to murder, torture,
corporal punishments, mu-
tilation and medical or
scientific experiments not
necessitated by medical
treatment of a protected
person, but also to any
other measures of brutality
whether applied by civil-
ian or military agents.
Article 27 is the basis of the Convention and proclaims the prin-
ciple of respect for the human being and the inviolable character of the
125basic rights of individual men and women. From Article 27 necessarily
flows the specific prohibitions of Articles 31 and 32 which are designed
to recall and prevent the barbaric and brutal atrocities which were per-
petrated during both world wars, especially those committed by the Axis
Powers during World V/ar II. The prohibition against killing in Article
32 is directed against any form of homicide not resulting from a capital
sentence adjudged by a court of law acting in accordance with the pro-
1 o(
visions of the Convention. With respect to torture, the prescription
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is absolute, that is, the prohibition is directed against all forms of
torture whether they are part of penal procedure or are quasi or extra
127judicial acts. Corporal punishment is prohibited simply to avoid
inflicting physical suffering. Mutilation is forbidden because by its
nature it is a reprehensible and especially offensive form of attack on
1 r\ Q
the dignity of the human person.
By resolution on March U, 1969, the United Nations Human Rights
Commission established a special Working Group of Experts to investigate
into alleged Israeli violations of the Civilians Convention within the
129
occupied territories. After a thorough investigation viiich included
the taking of sworn testimony of witnesses, the Working Group of Experts
issued a lengthy report listing and describing numerous examples of Israeli
1 30
violations of the Civilians Convention. The report discussed many
cases involving illegal killing, torture and maltreatment.
One 18 year old witness testified that two weeks after the commence-
ment of the June 1967 hostilities, Israeli soldiers shot down her father
before her eyes as they entered her house. Attempting to prevent the
slaying, the soldiers fired upon her and wounded her severely in her arm
and knee. At the same time her uncle and cousin had been badly beaten.
1 32
In the aftermath her arm required amputation.
Another witness described how on one occasion the Israeli soldiers
entered her house during lunch hour and lined her up along with her
husband and eight children. After her husband did not give the infor-
mation they requested of him, they savagely beat him. Following this






1 5 year old son grabbed a kni fe and attacked the soldiers.
For this her son was killed by the soldiers, after which the soldiers s
ceeded in raping her. The witness then continued by stating that while
in flight to Egypt she was raped a second time by Israeli soldiers.' 33
On another occasion a witness testified that she had been sexually mo-
lested by the Israeli Governor of Nablus Prison when she went to obtain
permission to visit her husband. 13
Mass murder has been reported by several witnesses. One Arab wi tn
testified that after the 1 9 6 7 "cease fire" there was indiscriminate and
mass shooting of ISO civilians by Israeli troops in Jerusalem streets. '35
This testimony was corroborated by the testimony of Archbishop Diodoros
who observed the presence of corpses in the streets of Jerusalem shortly
after the "cease fire." 136
Another witness reported that he had seen several adults being herded
by the Israelis to the rubbish heaps outside Rafah refugee camp. They
were then shot down and their bodies covered up through use of bulldozers. 137
On another occasion a witness reported the forcible eviction of
villagers in Tel Awra
.
After five days of marching the Israelis selected
16 young men and shot them in cold blood.' 38 This was coroborated by
another wi tness . 3
°
The Working Group of Experts also reported cases of mass torture.
Chiefly among these is the case where several persons were taken to the
house of a wealthy farmer. They were placed in several rooms and forced
against walls with their hands raised above their heads. They were forced
to remain in such position for three days after which they were taken out
<4l

and told to dig trenches each day for three days. Following this they
were made to stand holding heavy stones above their heads. They were
then told to leave their villages or be shot and buried in the trenches




In their report the Working Group of Experts made specific reference
to Israeli torture and maltreatment that is accorded confined or detained
I'll
persons in Israeli operated prisons. One witness displayed to the
Working Group scars on his head and chest which he stated were inflicted
upon him by rifles and bayonets during an interrogation. An Arab
physician testified that he had treated at the Public Health Hospital at
El-Arish patients brought from Israeli police posts. He treated them for
blows inflicted by rifle butts on tender parts of the body, burns on the
feet inflicted by hot wires or iron, and blows on the head which resulted
in concussion and deafness. The witness also revealed that he had per-
sonally witnessed a patient undergoing electric shock torture by Israeli
authorities. He finally stated that during the course of his service at
the hospital from June 19&7 until September 1968, there were at an average
10 cases of torture per day submitted by Israeli authorities to the hos-
I/43
pital for treatment.
Perhaps the most shocking accounts of torture in Israeli confinement
centers are contained in the Report on the Treatment of Certain Prisoners
under Interrogation in Israel prepared by Amnesty International. Dur-
ing the course of Amnesty's investigation a large number of torture cases
were compiled describing torture of a most cruel and inhuman nature. One
typical case history involved an Arab motor mechanic from Ramallah in the
k2

West Bank who was arrested on July 12, 1963 and detained and interrogated
for a period of seven months at both Ramallah and Sarafand Prisons. Amnesty
summarized his treatment at Sarafand in the following manner:
1. Being handcuffed, hands
behind back and feet shackeled
and being suspended by the
wrists from a window bar.
In this position he was
whipped and one of the in-
terrogators would stand on
his feet shackels greatly
increasing the strain.
2. Attaching alligator clips
to his ears and genitals
and passing an electric cur-
rent through them.
3. Inserting a biro refill
into the penis until it bled.
*4
. Running water on the weals
produced by whipping and then
puffing sulphur on them.
5. Crushing finger tips be-
tween the door hinges and
frame.
6. Having a water hose in-
serted into his mouth and
the tap turned on. An in-
terrogator would then stand
on his stomach, forcing the
water cut of his mouth. ?
Another shocking account of torture was related on April 17, 1970 to the
United Nations Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices in the
occupied territories. The Committee heard the testimony of a witness who
had been imprisoned by the Israeli authorities from August 19, 1968 until
September 1, 1969- He stated that he was accused of giving military in-
formation to the Ambassador of Iraq in Amman. He said that for 27 days
he had undergone torture which included the pulling of his hair, eyebrows
and whiskers. Additionally, he had been thrown on a floor, whereupon in-
terrogators jumped upon him, burned him with cigarettes and beat him with
^3

an electric fan, sticks and chairs. Police dogs were also set upon him.
In The Times of London, E. C. Hodgkin filed a report based upon a
personal visit to the occupied territories wherein he stated:
A common belief in the oc-
cupied areas held by all
resident there, not only
by the Arabs is that anyone
suspected of belonging to
a guerrilla organization
or or helping one in any way
is tortured as a matter of
routine, and there is a great
body of evidence to support
this belief. The methods
reported to be used follow
the pattern familiar from
Algeria, Hungary, Vietnam
and elsewhere, including
electrical treatment as well
as every form of beating.
Torture is said to be carried
out in the interrogation
centers at the Russian Com-
pound in Jerusalem, Sarafand
Camp and Ashkelon gaol. ^7
The summarized description of torture by Mr. Hodgkin is certainly
confirmed by the preceding evidence. The evidence reveals a con-
sistent pattern of atrocities which are in flagrant violation of the
Civilians Convention. None of the killings were executed in compliance
with a sentence imposed by a competent court of law. As discussed above,
torture and maltreatment are absolutely forbidden and cannot under any
circumstances be applied to protected persons.
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C. PROVISION PROHIBITING THE DESTRUCTION OF REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY
Article 53 of the Civilians Convention provides:
Any destruction by the Oc-
cupying Power of real or
personal property belonging
individually or collectively
to private persons, or to
the State, or to other public
authorities, or to social or
cooperative organizations,
is prohibited, except where
such destruction is rendered
absolutely necessary by mili-
tary operations.
The wording of this article is sufficiently clear so as not to re-
quire lengthy comment. The only exception authorizing destruction of
property is in the case "when such destruction is rendered absolutely
necessary by military operations." This has been interpreted to mean
that destruction is only justified when imperative military requirements
so demand. As one authority stated:
(T)here is no exception when
military operations are not
taking place in the immediate
area where the real or personal
property is located. ^9
The Working Group of Experts has reported numerous cases where Israeli
authorities have undertaken mass destruction of Arab towns and homes.
One witness testified in respect to the destruction of the villages of
Yalu, Beit-Nuba, and Emmaus in mid-October 1967- He stated that he had
seen Israelis carrying away the ruins of these villages in trucks, and
that on Christmas Day, 1967 he had seen the Israelis destroy the remain-
ing homes in Emmaus as well as the mosque. After leveling the ruins the
Israelis planted trees in their place. According to his testimony E"
kS

was destroyed in stages and was never involved in hostilities. Finally,
he stated that after the villages had been destroyed, the land was sold
by the Israelis. This account was corroborated by the testimony of an
152
eyewitness Christian clergyman.
The time period and intervals of destruction, along with the planting
of trees and later sale of property clearly indicate that the destruction
of these three Arab villages was not necessitated by imperative military
requirements but rather by other considerations. Perhaps one may better
appreciate the purpose of the destruction by focusing on the following
excerpts from a report which was submitted by a special deputation created
and sent to the occupied territories by the National Council of the Churches
of Christ in the United States;
The villages of Yalu, Beit -Nuba
and Emmaus were occupied by
Israeli military forces on
June 9, 1967, with little or
no destruction because the
Arab population did not re-
sist. Within the next five
weeks, all homes and other
buildings were systematically
destroyed except for a church
and two Muslim shrines in
Emmaus which were later de-
mo 1 i shed.
The people of the villages,
numbering over k, 000 have
been scattered.
From a military viewpoint,
the vi 1 lages had formed a
salient of Jordainian con-
trol in Palestine which
challenges Israel's main




From the political view-
point, the destruction of
the villages appears to be
a particular expression of
articulated Israeli policy
that the Arabs must be taught
by prompt, destructive re-
prisals that insubordination
will not be tolerated.
Economic considerations may
also be involved. Israel's
expressed policy is to pro-
vide for the settlement of
as many Jews as possible.
The fertile land of the
three villages (considerably
more than 3>000 acres) is
now being cultivated and
harvested by Israelis.
Israeli officials stated
clearly to the Deputation
that there is no plan to
rebuild the three villages
or to return the inhabitants
to their lands J 53
The same report describes that:
In various other places homes
of individuals alleged to have
collaborated with commandos
and homes of relatives of
alleged members of 'Al -Fatah 1
(an Arab liberation movement)
have been dynamited by mili-
tary authorities. Public
trials and hearings on the
allegations are not held, so
it is not possible to know
in which cases the allegations
are indisputable. The justi-
fication which is given, both
for the destruction of indi-
vidual homes and for the dy-
namiting of larger sections
of villages, is the political
purpose of making the Arab
residents accept Israel's rule




In an official report, United Nations Secretary General U~Thant mad<
1 55
note of the destruction in occupied East Jerusalem. Based on reports
from Ambassador Thalmann, his personal representative who observed the
situation in occupied Jerusalem, the Secretary-General stated that about
135 houses in the Magharibah Quarter, the area near the Wailing Wall,
were dynamited by Israeli authorities, thus making 650 Arabs homeless as
a matter of convenience to Israeli officials.
There have been unofficial reports of mass destruction in non-Arab
newspapers. One third party report stated:
Within a week of the end of
the fighting (of June 19&7)
the bulldozers were at work
in the old city (Jerusalem)
and before the end of June,
they (the Israelis) had made, r7
nearly k ,000 Arabs homeless.
On June 27, I969 , over two years after effective Israeli occupation
an American weekly reported:
Since occupying the City
(of East Jerusalem) the
Israelis have bulldozed an
Arab section to create a
broad plaza, and their ar-
chaeologists have made ex-
tensive excavations to un-
cover more of the (wailinq)
wall. 158
An American daily reported on June 22, 19&9:
A hundred Arabs were given
a week to leave their land
which was appropriated by
Israeli authorities near
Hebron. 159
Then on March 26, 1970, the same daily reported:
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The Israeli Government an-
nounced today that it would
assist in the settlement of
50 families in Hebron, an
Arab town in the occupi ed
part of Jordan. l6 °
Mr. Hodgkin gives perhaps the most striking account of mass destruc-
tion in his article cited earlier. He stated:
On the latest pre-Halhul
(Halhul is a village be-
tween Bethlehem and Hebron)
tally, 7,1^0 Arab houses have
been blown up. This includes
entire villages which have
been destroyed for security
reasons, but in the majority
of cases the houses were blown
up because somebody suspected
of connection with guerilla
activity was living in them.
What particularly angers Arabs
is that destruction often
takes place as soon as a
suspect is carried off.
There is no waiting for him
to be charged, let alone con-
victed. Nor does it matter
if he is not the owner of the
house. Innocent or guilty,
tenant or visitor or owner,
the explosives go in. Requi-
sition of buildings is a lesser
irritant, though the conversion
of the brand-new hospital in
East Jerusalem to police head- .,.
quarters is a constant affront.
Based upon this evidence the conclusion is inescapable that the mass
destruction of property was not necessitated by imperative military neces-
sity. The evidence shows that the destruction has been taking place con-
tinuously for over two years, a period in which Israel has been in effec-
tive control of the occupied territories. It appears that the destruction
^9

was required not by imperative military necessity but rather by economic,
cultural and political reasons, factors which are not included when con-
sidering imperati ve mi 1 i tary requirements.
D. PROVISION PROHIBITING THE LOOTING OF PROPERTY
The Second paragraph of Article 33 of the Civilians Convention states
in clear and unequi voca 1 language that "(P)illage is prohibited." This
provision is absolute in character and without exception. Under no cir-
cumstances may looting be ordered or authorized. It is designed to pro-
tect the real and personal property of individuals and outlaw the infamous
practice of booty which was considered in former wars as part of a soldiers
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pay.
In the report of the Working Group of Experts, the testimony of wit-
nesses revealed that there was general and thorough looting of whole vil-
lages, hospitals and places of worship. In one case a witness reported
that Israeli troops dismantled and removed machinery from factories and
workshops in Jericho. In another case a witness stated that food con-
tained in two shops owned by him was taken away by Israeli forces. Later
when the villagers were fleeing to Egypt an Israeli helicopter intercepted
the villagers and forced them to surrender all their valuables. A
physician testified that the Israelis removed the dispensary from his




A final appreciation of the extent of the looting oF property can be
gained by looking at the report of the Commissioner General of the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.
The report stated :
In the Gaza Strip during and
immediately after the hostili-
ties, ninety of the Agency's
100 schools were damaged and
looted in varying degrees to
the extent of an estimated
$220,000 in value. 167
E. PROVISIONS PROHIBITING REPRISALS AND COLLECTIVE PENALTIES
Article 33 provides in part:
No protected person may be
punished for an offense he
or she has not personally
committed. Collective pen-
alties and likewise all
measures of intimidation or
of terrorism are prohibited.
Reprisals against protected
persons and their property
are prohi bi ted .
The absolute and unequivocal prohibitions contained in Article 33
were necessitated by the experience of World War II, during which the
Axis Powers engaged in a reign of terror accompanied by collective punish-
ments and reprisals that shocked the conscience of mankind. The prohibitions
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against collective penalties and reprisals do no more than recognize a
fundamental principle of humanity and justice, namely that penal respon-
sibility is personal in character and that no person should be punished
for an act for which he is neither morally nor legally responsible. Dur-
ing past wars, especially the last world war, collective penalties were
inflicted to prevent and repress hostile acts against a belligerent and
as such they amounted to intimidatory measures aimed at terrorizing the
civilian population. Used as an intimidatory and terrorist device, col-
lective penalties strike at the guilty and innocent alike and offend
against all principles of humanity and justice. It is for that reason that
the provisions forbidding collective penalties is followed formally by
the prohibition of all methods of intimidation and terrorism.
Reference has already been made to the large number of homes destroyed
by Israeli authorities since their effective occupation of Arab terri-
tories. In many cases these homes were destroyed for the purpose of ad-
ministering reprisals and collective penalties. Witnesses testified be-
fore the Working Group of Experts that their homes were destroyed because
they had failed to provide the information requested by Israeli officials
169
or because of a suspected connection with the resistance movement.
Corroboration of this can be found in the article by Mr. Hodgkin, earlier
cited, wherein he describes that:
(l)n the majority of cases the
houses were b 1 own up because
somebody suspected of connec-
tion with guerilla activity
was living in them.
(T)be Israelis say that every-
thing is the fault of the gue-
rillas -- the fedayin. If
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they would only stop their
raiding and bomb throwing
there would be no need for
repressi on. '70
Additionally, an American daily reported:
Israeli authorities recently
began demolishing homes of
Arabs who had been uncoopera-
tive in investigations of
terrorism or who had declined
to come forward with informa-
tion. 1 71
Confiscation has also been resorted to by Israeli officials as a
collective penalty in violation of Article 33- On November 2, 1968,
Arab shop owners did not open their stores in occupied Jerusalem as a
protest measure. A few hours later Israeli officials responded by con-
1 72
fi seating the stores of 15 Arab shop owners.
Another method of reprisals or collective penalties imposed upon
the Arab population is the curfew. In Nablus the Israelis clamped a
full curfew on the town after Arab shop owners refused to open their
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stores. Mr. Hodgkin gives us a vivid description of the purpose and
harshness of curfews in the following words:
(Curf ews ) .
.
.are a weapon of
authority in every difficult
situation. They can, how-
ever, be applied as precau-
tionary measures or as punish-
ments, and the Israelis pre-
fer to use them as punishments.
The example of Beit Sahur, just
outside Bethlehem, is fresh
in everyone's memory. This is
a community of settled tribes-
men, each family living in a
small box-like stone house.
It was near this straggling
village that rockets were
installed, two of which fell
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in Jerusalem last August.
The Israelis claimed, no
doubt with reason, that
some of the villagers must
have known what was going
on. So a total curfew was
imposed. For a week nobody
was allowed to leave their
house or to open a window.
As the latrines are outside
the houses, and as it is
very hot in Palestine in
August, the result was not
pleasant. Outside the live-
stock of the villagers died or
was requisitioned. A modi-
fied curfew persisted for
some weeks longer.'^
Curfew has also been used as a measure of intimidation. A former
journalist of The Guard i an of London testified before the Special Com-
mittee to Investigate Israeli Practices in Occupied Territories that he
witnessed curfews imposed for more than five days affecting food and
water supplies worse than anything he had experienced in four years as a
prisoner of war in a German prison camp. He continued by stating that
they were a part of collective punishments designed to create a state of
anxiety and shock in order to intimidate refugees to leave the occupied
terri tori es
.
In the November 29, 19&9 issue of the Sunday Ti mes of London, a re-
port refers to curfews accompanied by terror and maltreatment imposed in
Gaza by describing an account given by an Israeli soldier as follows:
In the tougher cases, the
same curfew rules applied,
but only the women were
kept indoors. The men were
driven into the dessert in
trucks and sometimes beaten
up on the way. When they
arrived at an isolated spot
5k

they were divided accord-
ing to age into two groups.
They were then forced to
squat on their haunches in
the sun under guard for sev-
eral hours he (the Israeli
soldier) says for as long
as eight hours at a time.
(H)alf a dozen soldiers told
him (the Israeli soldier) that
the best way to combat ter-
rorism was to bind suspects
tightly with electric wire
on arms and legs, and leave
them in the sun.' 7"
That reprisals and collective penalties are undertaken with official
sanction is made clear by a statement made by the Israeli Defense Minister
Moshe Dayan. The New York Times reported Mr. Dayan to have described the
measures undertaken in the occupied territories as necessary 'to make sure
the resident Arabs know that Israel represents the governing authority."
The same report continued:
Asked if Israel was applying
collective punishment in re-
sponse to (resistence) ac-
tivities, Mr. Dayan said he
preferred to call it neighbor-
hood punishment . ^ 7 J
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F. PROVISIONS PROHIBITING THE DEPORTATION OR TRANSFER OF CIVILIAN
POPULATION IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
Article hS of the Civilians Convention provides, inter alia ;
Individual or mass forcible
transfers, as well as depor-
tations of protected persons
from occupied territory to
the terri tory of the Occupy-
ing Power or to that of any
other country, occupied or
not, are prohibited, regard-
less of their motive.
Nevertheless the occupying
Power may undertake total
or partial evacuation of a
given area if the security
of the population or impera-
tive military reasons so
demand. Such evacuations
may not involve the dis-
placement of protected per-
sons outside the bounds of
the occupied territory ex-
cept when for material
reasons it is impossible
to avoid such displacement.
Persons thus evacuated shall
be transferred back to their
homes as soon as hostilities
in the area in question have
c ea s ed .
The Occupying Power shall not
deport or transfer parts of its
own civilian population into
the territory it occupies.
The need for Article ^3 was necessitated by the memory of forced de-
portations by Germany of millions of men, women and children during World
179
War II and the replacement of these people by German civilians. The
provisions are absolute except when required by imperative military ne-
cessity or when necessary to secure the safety of the population, that
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is, when the presence of the population is endangered by military opera-
tions or when the presence of civilians seriously jeopardizes military
180
operati ons .
In the report of the Working Group of Experts witnesses testified
as to enforced deportation and transfers of leaders and professionals,
including teachers. At times witnesses testified as to whole villages
being the subject of transfer. In some instances Arab civilians were
1 8
1
forced to flee as a result of direct Israeli threat or terror. For
example, one physician testified that he had been deported against his
will for no apparent reason. The same witness stated that Arab profes-
sionals and leaders were being deported in order to deprive the Arab
people of their leadership and therby erode their morale and eventually
force the Arab population to leave the occupied territories. In
Bethlehem, according to one witness, loudspeakers were used to encourage
civilians to flee to Jericho "(l)f (they) wished to save (their) lives."
The use of loudspeakers to influence civilians to flee their homes was
18*4
corroborated by other witnesses. There are numerous other examples
contained in the report of the Working Group of Experts.
In a report of the United Nations Secretary-General based upon ob-
servations made by special Representative Nils-Goran Gussing in the
occupied territories, reference is made to shooting in the air incidents,
The report states:
The Special Representative
felt that it was likely that
many such indicents had taken
place and that the Israeli
forces had not viewed unfavor-
ably the impact of such in-
cidents on the movement of
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population out of the area.
At no point during discus-
sions on this subject was
the Special Representative
ever informed of any action
taken by the Israeli authori-
ties to reassure the population.
Whatever the policy of the
Israeli Government may have
been as regards the population,
it seemed clear to the Special
Representative that at the
local level certain actions
authorized or allowed by
local military commanders were
an important cause of their
flight J 8 5
The evidence presented reveals that the large number of deportations
was not necessitated by military operations or out of a desire to safe-
guard the population. Rather it appears that the removal of civilians
was the immediate result of illegal terror or coercion, either direct or
indirect. Under such circumstances the transfers were in clear violation
of Article k3
.
Israel has also violated the provisionsof Article ^9 by its refusal
to allow those Arab refugees residing in neighboring Arab States to
return to their homes in the occupied territories. These Arab refugees
number approximately 800,000, almost all of whom wish to return to their
homes. In a survey conducted among the refugees, it was revealed that
approximately 91 per cent of the refugees desire to return to their homes
immediately rather than wait until such time as Israel withdraws from the
occupied territories. Return, however, has been relatively impossible in
view of the fact that Israel has sealed off the borders of the occupied
1 87
territories. Out of over 150,000 Arab refugees who had applied to
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return to areas they fled, only 1^,000 have been permitted to do so by
.. rr. • , 188
Israeli officials.
Even if it could be realistically assumed that the Israeli Government
was not wholly responsible for the population transfers, it is nevertheless
responsible for sealing off the boundaries and not allowing the return of
the refugees to their homes. While hostilities do indeed still exist
between Israel and its neighboring Arab States, they do not consist of
such a magnitude so as to render unsafe all the areas from which the
refugees fled. Israel, therefore, cannot satisfy Article ^9 by simply
permitting token return.
If the deportation and continued refusal to allow the refugees to
return to their homes is not rendered necessary by military operations or
the need to safeguard the population, then the question can rightly be
asked, what is the motive behind such enforced and continuing deportation?
The motive appears to be none other than one of illegal territorial
aggrandizement. Mr. Hodgkin describes this motive in the following
manner :
I must confess that when
going around the West Bank
I found it difficult to
avoid the conclusion that
this (annexation) is Israel's
aim. Israelis see the Jordan
River as historically and
strategically a natural fron-
tier. So the new settlements
go up on the West Bank, the
new buildings rise like mush-
rooms in and around Jerusalem,
the new military roads and
communications are constructed.
These are the evidence of a




The only inconvenience is
the presence of a rather
a lot of Arabs -- 650,000
on the West Bank and another
^50,000 on the Gaza Strip.
As it would be much simpler
if these were not there,
every effort is being made
to persuade them to go.
The most important ones to
be got rid of are those with
education and authority. ""
The eventual realization of a greater and expanded Israel has been
the aim of the Zionist-Israeli government since the time of its creation.
Former Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion wrote: "Only now (1951)
...have we reached the beginning of independence in a part of our small
190
country." He continued: "To maintain the status quo will not do. We
have set up a dynamic State, bent upon creation, reform, building and
191
expansion." In reference to Israel's annexation of Jerusalem, Mr. Dayan
1 92
states: "(l)t is the fulfillment of a people's ancestral dream."
Later he spoke of the need to retain the West Bank and Gaza for "To deny
193
such yearning means to ignore the basis of the return to Zion."
Regarding the Golan Heights, Yegal Allon, Israel's Deputy Prime Minister,
stated: "The Golan is no less part of ancient Israel than Hebron and
1 3k
Nablus, for did not Jeptha judge there?" It was Allon who called for
settlements to "strike roots" in the Jordan Valley, the Hebron, the Golan
195
Heights and Gaza, claiming there was historical justification.
Clearly, such territorial imperatives only serve to confirm that the
mass forcible transfers and continued reFusal to allow the Arab refugees
to return to their homes are in violation of Article ^9. As final cor-
roboration the statement of Mr. Dayan on Face the Nation is relevant.
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In responding to a question as to whether there is any possible way in
which Israel could absorb the Arabs in the occupied territories, he
stated :
Economically we can; but I
think that it is not in
accord with our aim to the
future. It would turn Israel
into either a bi -national
or poly-Arab-Jewish State
instead of a Jewish State,
and we want to have a Jewish
State. We can absorb them
but then it won't be the same
country . '°"
It is because of its territorial imperatives that Israel is cornmit-
i ng a clear violation of Article ^9 by transferring parts of its own
population to new settlements in the occupied territories. The prohibition
of such transfers is absolute. Reference has already been made to the
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recently announced Israeli resettlement of Hebron. However, even prior
to that announcement, Israeli authorities admitted that they had created
\k Israeli settlements in other occupied areas, principally in the Golan
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Heights. Additionally, Israel is preparing housing projects in oc
-
1 99
cupied Jerusalem for approximately ^0,000 Jewish immigrants.
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V. APPRAISAL AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Ultimate resolution of the Middle East problem which has been sur-
rounded by so much bloodshed and human deprivation must be based upon a
notion of sovereignty that recognizes and implements an i ncl usi ve concept
of nationality which does not discriminate or privilege within the nation-
State on the basis of religion, race or ethnic background. It appears that
Zionism as presently constituted is unwilling to permit any alteration of
the excl usi ve characteri sties of Zionist-Israel.
However, the prime immediate concern of the world community should
be the restoration of human dignity in the occupied territories through
effective enforcement of the Civilians Convention. Article 1 of the
Civilians Convention provides that "The High Contracting Parties undertake
to respect and to ensure respect of the present Convention in all circum-
stances (emphasis supplied)." Accordingly, when a party to the Civilians
Convention refuses to carry out its obligations, the other States bound by
the Civilians Convention can and must endeavor to bring the recalcitrant
201
State back to the respect of its engagements. To this extent the
organized world community is under a moral as well as a legal obligation
to devise an adequate and systematic sanctioning procedure. Failure to
do so will only result in continued and increased violence in the occupied
territories. It is axiomatic that when international law is not enforced
by the world community through means of adequate sanctions, a transgressing
202
State is more able and inclined to commit further violations. In
counteraction the victims are thrown into despair and forced to engage in
responding violence as the only apparent effective means to redress in-
203justices. Nevertheless, an i ndespensi b 1 e prerequisite to effective
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implementation of the sanctioning process as it would pertain to Israeli
practices in the occupied territories is wide public awareness and under-
standing of the humanitarian provisions of the Civilians Convention and
how these provisions are specifically being violated. Wi thout an aroused
public conscience an orderly and progressive sanctioning process may
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